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Abstract:  
We study how the recent expansion of mobile phone coverage affects the degree of 
consumption smoothing using data collected in rural Uganda in 2003 and 2005. We found 
that mobile phone coverage helps consumption smoothing against covariate shocks but not 
idiosyncratic shocks. Unlike in studies on informal risk sharing, but in line with the 
permanent income hypothesis, we also found that household-level consumption changes are 
insenitive to transitory household income shocks, but sensitive to permanent household 
income shocks. Full intertemporal self-insurance is, however, impossible under imperfect 
credit and insurance markets. Our results show that households effectively combine 
self-insurance, local risk sharing, and long-distance risk sharing via mobile phone, where 
idiosyncratic shocks are partially mitigated by self-insurance as well as mutual insurance 
within local communities, while covariate shocks are partially mitigated by self-insurance 
and across distant communities via mobile phones. 
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1. Introduction 
The livelihoods of rural households in developing countries are exposed and 
vulnerable to various exogenous income risks such as natural disasters, conflicts, disease 
epidemics, and price fluctuations. Protecting the poor from such risks has been one of the 
most important political and research agendas for achieving sustainable poverty reduction. 
It is theoretically possible for poor households to self-insure for those risks and smooth 
consumption by purchasing insurance or saving in good times and dissaving/borrowing in 
bad times, as the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) suggests. It has long been believed, 
however, that such autarkic intertemporal risk management does not work properly under 
imperfect credit and insurance markets, which have been pervasive in most developing 
countries. 
The poor in developing countries have undertaken costly self-insurance strategies 
due to the limited risk management options available through financial markets. For 
example, they smooth income by diversifying their economic activities into pieces of 
low-return but stable income sources instead of pursuing risky but potentially higher 
income-generating activities (Morduch, 1995). They also sell productive assets such as 
livestock or withdraw children from school against income shocks, which jeopardizes their 
long-term income growth, thereby placing them into poverty traps (Fafchamps et al., 1998; 
Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997).  
The literature argues that informal interstate risk-sharing arrangements have 
developed as an alternative intertemporal insurance mechanism within small local 
communities, where household-specific idiosyncratic income fluctuations are pooled and 
shared among local community members. As a result of this informal mechanism, 
idiosyncratic income shocks are at least partly mitigated to help consumption smoothing, 
although the full income sharing hypothesis tends to be rejected (Townsend, 1994: Udry, 
1994). On the other hand, since neighboring community members all suffer similar 
downside shocks, covariate income shocks impose serious challenges for welfare dynamics 
among the poor who rely on mutual assistance because such shocks cannot be insured 
through local risk-sharing arrangements (Takahashi et al., 2016). Rosenzweig and Stark 
(1989) point out that families in rural India spread risk over wide geographical areas by 
marrying their daughters to distant households and requesting remittances in times of need. 
While a few case studies on long-distance risk sharing have been conducted, as 
transaction and communication costs are generally high, long-distance risk sharing has not 
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been common until recently. Rapidly growing mobile phone networks in developing 
countries, including in sub-Saharan Africa, have dramatically changed the situation. Aker 
and Mbiti (2010) find that the expansion of mobile phone networks in Africa has 
remarkably reduced search and transaction costs, facilitating coordination among agents 
across geographical regions and thus decreasing price dispersion across them. 
Along this line, several studies show that the reduced communication costs 
associated with expanding mobile telephone facilitate informal risk management over long 
distance. Bulmenstock et al. (2016) demonstrate that mobile money transactions over long 
distance were intensified immediately after local covariate shocks, exemplified by 
earthquakes, occurred in Rwanda. Jack and Suri (2014) show that mobile phone possession 
in Kenya reduces the sensitivity of consumption to negative income shocks because of the 
increased mobile money remittances among relatives after the shocks occur. Munyegera 
and Matsumoto (2016) also show that adopting mobile money services increases household 
per capita consumption by 72%, due mainly to the increased remittances.  
In this paper, we investigate the differential impact of mobile phone coverage on 
the sensitivity of consumption to idiosyncratic and covariant income shocks. Long-distance 
risk sharing through mobile phone communication would be an emerging option for 
households, especially in the face of covariate risks that are difficult to cope with at the 
local community level. It could also be used for idiosyncratic shocks. Relative dependency 
on local risk sharing and long-distance risk sharing against idiosyncratic shocks is 
ambiguous and depends on the strength of the social ties within each network and the level 
of the transaction costs for each option. By interacting mobile phone networks with 
idiosyncratic and covariant income shocks, we explicitly investigate how mobile phones 
help household consumption smoothing against not only covariant income shocks but also 
idiosyncratic income shocks.   
The data used in this study are drawn from two-year panel data collected in rural 
Uganda in 2003 and 2005. During this period, local communities covered by mobile phone 
networks sharply increased from 15.3% to 46.2%. Since mobile money had not been 
introduced during the survey periods, people used informal channels (e.g., servants, friends, 
relatives, bus drivers) to send remittances upon request. Although such means may still be 
risky and costly compared to mobile money transactions, it is hypothesized that expanding 
mobile phone networks would increase information flows, thereby promoting mutual 
assistance with friends and relatives over long distances.  
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In the estimation, we extend the standard empirical model of full income sharing, 
which generally assumes that (1) permanent income components are, by definition, time 
invariant and that (2) both permanent and transitory incomes are fully pooled and shared 
within members of a social network. However, assets (and household demographic 
characteristics) that determine the time path of permanent future income may not 
necessarily be time invariant due to asset accumulation/loss and changes in expected 
returns to assets over time. In particular, when we rely only on short-term panel data, 
observed income changes will consist of transitions of the permanent income to the steady 
state, regardless of whether it is single or multiple equilibria, as well as stochastic changes 
due to transitory shocks (Naschold and Barrett, 2011). Furthermore, the permanent and 
transitory income changes will not be perfectly observable to community members, leading 
to a limited commitment to and violation of the second assumption above (Coate and 
Ravallion, 1993; Ligon, 1998). These demonstrate the importance of incorporating a 
permanent household income shock into an explanatory variable, allowing us to examine 
the extent of the sensitivity of consumption changes with respect to permanent and 
transitory income shocks as well as covariate shocks.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the data source 
and presents the descriptive statistics of the sample households. Section 3 explains the 
estimation strategies. Section 4 discusses the estimation results, while Section 5 extends the 
analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Data Description and Sample Villages 
2.1. Data Source  
 This study uses data from 871 households in rural Uganda surveyed both in 2003 
and 2005 as part of the Research on Poverty, Environment, and Agricultural Technology 
(RePEAT) project. The RePEAT project was initiated by the National Graduate Institute 
for Policy Studies and the Foundation of Advanced Studies on International Development 
in Japan, in close collaboration with Makerere University.  
 The sampling in the RePEAT project in Uganda was based largely on that of an 
earlier IFPRI survey. Out of the original 107 Local Councils (the lowest administrative unit 
in Uganda), 94 were selected. Because of security concerns in the northern and northeastern 
parts of the country, we excluded those LC1s from our samples. From each selected LC1, 
10 households were randomly chosen, and 940 households were interviewed in 2003. 
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Among the 940 households interviewed in the first round, the interview teams for the 
second survey in 2005 found that five households had been dissolved, 16 households had 
moved out, 15 households could not be contacted by the teams, three households refused to 
be interviewed, and seven households were not interviewed for unknown reasons. As a 
result, 895 households were interviewed again in 2005.  
 Out of those 895 households, we dropped 24 households with missing values, 
yielding 871 balanced-panel households for analysis. 
 
2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 displays the sample distribution by region and by mobile phone coverage 
over time. We consider that LC1 is covered by mobile phone networks if at least one 
sample household in the LC1 possesses a mobile phone at the time of the survey. Because 
sharing mobile phones among local community members is common in rural Uganda, we 
believe that LC1-level mobile phone networks capture the household accessibility of 
mobile phones better than individual possession does. The numbers in each cell represent 
the percentage of households out of the total sample households, while the numbers in 
parentheses represent the percentage of households in each region.  
 As can be seen, about 15% of households were covered in both 2003 and 2005, 
31% of households were newly covered in 2005, and the remaining 54% were never 
covered by mobile phone networks during the observation periods. There are variations 
across and within regions. In 2003, households in the central region, which is wealthier 
than the other regions, had better access to mobile phones: 28% of households within the 
central region were connected to mobile phone networks, and those in the east and west 
regions lagged behind. However, coverage improved more rapidly for the east and west 
regions, with 34% and 31% of households gaining access in 2005, respectively, compared 
with 28% in the central region in the same year. Although the central region still had the 
best access in 2005, nearly 40% and 50% of households in the east and west were covered 
by mobile phone networks by 2005.  
 Table 2 shows changes in household welfare over time via mobile phone coverage. 
We classify poverty status by consumption expenditure per adult equivalent. Following 
Appleton (2003) and Yamano et al. (2004), equivalence scales are computed by the age and 
gender of each household member. Total expenditure is constructed by summing up cash 
expenditure and the value of self-consumption of home-produced food items. Total income 
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is the sum of self-employed and wage incomes, ranging over crop, livestock, nonfarm and 
non-labor sources, including remittances and rental earnings. We compute self-employed 
incomes by subtracting the paid-out costs from the total value production, while wage 
incomes are the sum of salaries from regular jobs as well as wage earnings from seasonal 
jobs. Total expenditure and income in 2003 are adjusted to 2005 price levels, and the 
poverty line is set at 161 USD per adult equivalent at the 2005 price levels. Households are 
identified as “poor” when the expenditure per adult equivalent is less than the poverty line.  
 It is clear that households covered by mobile phone networks are better off than 
are those that were never covered. The average expenditure per adult equivalent was greater 
than 200 USD in the first group (covered in both 2003 and 2005) and second group (newly 
covered in 2005), while it was only about 180 USD in the third group (never covered) both 
in 2003 and 2005. Similarly, the poverty head count ratios were around 48% in the first two 
groups, lower by about 12% than the third group in 2003 and 2005. The t-test on the mean 
differences reveals that the average per capita adult equivalent expenditure and poverty 
head count ratios were significantly different at the 1% level between the first two groups 
and the third group in both years. On the other hand, no statistical difference is observed in 
those figures between the first and second groups in both years. Obviously, these 
observations alone cannot establish a causal impact of mobile phone coverage on household 
welfare, as a reverse causality can exist (i.e., whereby better-off communities are more 
likely to be covered by mobile phones).   
 To obtain more insight into the welfare dynamics of mobile phone coverage, 
Figure 1 shows a locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) on the log initial per 
adult equivalent expenditure (horizontal axis) and its change between 2003 and 2005 
(vertical axis). It shows that all three groups exhibit almost linear downward slopes, 
suggesting that the rate of consumption growth is higher for the initially poorer households. 
It is also important to note that the slope is slightly flatter for households newly covered by 
mobile phone networks, implying that consumption volatility is smaller for households if 
they gained access to mobile phone networks in 2005.  
 Whether or not the demonstrated small consumption volatility is associated with 
the ability to mitigate idiosyncratic and covariate income shocks is an important question; 
this is addressed in the following sections.  
 
3. Estimation Strategies 
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3.1. Impact of Mobile Phone on Consumption Smoothing 
Following Townsend (1994), the benchmark equation for examining consumption 
sensitivity against shocks can be expressed as  
ܿ௜௝,௧ ൌ ܽଵ ൅ ܽଶݕ௜௝,௧ ൅ ܽଷܿ௝̅,௧ ൅ ߠ௜ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝,௧, 
where ܿ௜௝,௧, ݕ௜௝,௧,	 and	ܿ௝̅,௧  are the per adult equivalent consumption of household i in 
community j at time t, per adult equivalent income of household i in community j at time t, 
and average per adult equivalent consumption of commodity j at time t, respectively; 
ܽଵ, ܽଶ,	and	ܽଷ  are parameters to be estimated; ߠ௜	 and		 ߤ௧  repserent household 
time-invariant fixed effects and a time dummy, respectively; and ߝ௜௝,௧ is an error term.  
  Taking the first difference, the above equation can be rewritten as  
∆ܿ௜௝,௧ ൌ ∆ߤ௧ ൅ ܽଶ∆ݕ௜௝,௧ ൅ ܽଷ∆ܿ௝̅,௧ ൅ ∆ߝ௜௝,௧,  (1)  
where∆denotes changes in each variable over time, such that ∆ܿ௜௝,௧ ൌ ܿ௜,௧ െ ܿ௜,௧ିଵ , 
∆ݕ௜௝,௧ ൌ ݕ௜,௧ െ ݕ௜,௧ିଵ, ∆ܿ௝̅,௧ ൌ ܿ௝̅,௧ െ ܿ௝̅,௧ିଵ, ∆ߤ௧ ൌ ߤ௧ െ ߤ௧ିଵ,and ∆ߝ௜௝,௧ ൌ ߝ௜,௧ െ ߝ௜,௧ିଵ.  
The standard empirical model assumes that the permanent income component is 
time-invariant and is eliminated by taking the first difference. Therefore, ∆ݕ௜௝,௧ shows 
only transitory idiosyncratic income shocks, whereas ∆ܿ௝̅,௧ is the covariate shocks that 
affect all households within a community. Although we relax this assumption later, the 
coefficients of interests here are definitely ܽଶ and ܽଷ. The full income-sharing hypothesis 
implies that the coefficient of ܽଶ is zero and that of ܽଷ is unity.  
To allow for the differential sensitivity of the consumption to idiosyncratic and 
covariate shocks via mobile phone accessibility, we introduce interaction terms with each 
variable in Eq (1) as  
∆ܿ௜௝,௧ ൌ ∆ߤ௧൅ܾଵ∆݉݋ ௝ܾ,௧ ൅ ܽଶ∆ݕ௜௝,௧ ൅ ܾଶሺ∆ݕ௜௝,௧ ∗ ∆݉݋ ௝ܾ,௧ሻ 
൅ܽଷ∆ܿ௝̅,௧൅ܾଷሺ∆ܿ௝̅,௧ ∗ ∆݉݋ ௝ܾ,௧ሻ ൅ ∆ߝ௜௝,௧.  (2)  
 ∆݉݋ ௝ܾ,௧ denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 if the community gained new access 
to mobile phones between 2003 and 2005 and zero otherwise. As explained, we do not use 
changes in individual possession of mobile phones during the same periods because the 
community-level coverage would be more likely to reflect individual mobile phone 
accessibility. Moreover, individual possession is more likely to be endogenous, depending 
on individual characteristics. Thus, we consider ∆݉݋ ௝ܾ,௧  as an exogenous shock to 
individuals.  
In Eq. (2) , if long-distance risk sharing is effective when covariate shocks occur, 
the coefficient of ܾଷ  would be negative, implying a reduction in the degree of 
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comovement in consumption with neighboring households. On the other hand, if 
long-distance risk sharing is effective in managing idiosyncratic shocks, the coefficient of 
ܾଶ would be negative.  
One of the potential critiques of Eq. (2) is that changes in access to mobile phone 
network are not random, implying placement bias. In fact, Muto and Yamano (2009) argue 
that the population density of a community and other regional characteristics are associated 
with mobile phone network coverage in rural Uganda. We control for such non-random 
placement by fixed effects.  
Besides, Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) criticize this type of estimation and 
recommend using community dummy variables instead of the average per capita 
consumption of the community to obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients on 
idiosyncratic income components. Thus, as a robustness check, we estimate the following 
equation:  
∆ܿ௜௝,௧ ൌ ∆ߤ௧൅ܾଵܦ௝ ൅ ܽଶ∆ݕ௜௝,௧ ൅ ܾଶሺ∆ݕ௜௝,௧ ∗ ∆݉݋ ௝ܾ,௧ሻ ൅ ∆ߝ௜௝,௧,   (3) 
where ܦ௝ is a set of community dummy variables.  
 
3.2. Impacts of Permanent and Transitory Income Shocks and Covariate Shocks 
An important assumption underlying Eq. (1) is that ∆ݕ௜௝,௧  captures only a 
transitory income shock. However, this assumption might be implausible for several 
reasons. First, assets that determine the time path of permanent future income may not 
necessarily be time invariant due to asset accumulation and changes in expected returns for 
those assets overtime. While asset dynamics could have a linear trend, several studies 
emphasize the possibility of non-linear asset dynamics that may yield multiple wealth 
equilibria (Carter and Barrett, 2006; Santos and Barrett, 2006). Thus, when we have to rely 
on short-term panel data, as in our case, observed income changes would be brought about 
by the transition process to multiple stable equilibria governed by initial asset holdings and 
their dynamics as well as by stochastic changes brought about by transitory shocks 
(Nashold and Barrett, 2011). While it is difficult to distinguish between these two, simply 
treating ∆ݕ௜௝,௧ as a transitory idiosyncratic shock would be misleading.  
Second, in line with Paxson (2002) and Kazianga and Udry (2006), the test of the 
relative importance of permanent and transitory income on consumption smoothing is 
important in evaluating the validity of PIH along with the full income-sharing hypothesis. 
If autarkic self-insurance is possible and PIH is valid, permanent household income growth 
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is perfectly correlated with consumption growth, while that of transitory income shocks and 
covariate shocks do not affect individual consumption changes at all. Moreover, if the full 
income sharing hypothesis is rejected because part of permanent income changes is hidden 
due to asymmetric information among members of a social network, permanent household 
income shocks would be partially correlated with individual consumption changes. In this 
circumstance, covariate shocks would also be partially correlated with individual 
consumption changes as long as local risk sharing at the community is active.  
To test these alternative hypotheses, we assume that the realized income change 
can be decomposable into the permanent, transitory, and unexplained income changes, 
expressed by  
∆ݕො௜௝,௧௉ ൌ ݎଵ൅ߛଶ∆ݔ௜௝,௧௉ ,   
              ∆ݕො௜௝,௧் ൌ ߛଷ∆ݔ௜௝,௧் ,              (4) 
∆߱௜௝,௧ ൌ ∆ݕ௜௝,௧ െ ∆ݕො௜௝,௧௉ െ ∆ݕො௜௝,௧் , 
where ∆ݕො௜௝,௧௉  represents a permanent income change due to changes in household assets 
and demographic characteristics, denoted as ∆ݔ௜௝,௧௉ , and due to their returns, ݎଵ	and	ߛଶ; 
∆ݕො௜௝,௧்  represents a transitory income change due to individual shocks such as crop damage 
and illness of household members, denoted as ∆ݔ௜௝,௧் , and their returns, ߛଷ; and ∆߱௜௝,௧ is 
the residual, representing the unexplained income change. Then, following Paxson (1992) 
and Kazianga and Udry (2006), the estimable income growth function is  
∆ݕ௜௝,௧ ൌ ݎଵ൅ߛଶ∆ݔ௜௝,௧௉ ൅ ߛଷ∆ݔ௜௝,௧் ൅ ∆߱௜௝,௧    (5) 
Substituting Eq. (4) and (5) into Eq. (1), we can derive the following specification: 
∆ܿ௜௝,௧ ൌ ∆ߤ௧ ൅ ܽଶଵ∆ݕො௜௝,௧௉ ൅ ܽଶଶ∆ݕො௜௝,௧் ൅ ܽଶଷ∆߱௜௝,௧ ൅ ܽଷ∆ܿ௝̅,௧ ൅ ∆ߝ௜௝,௧.  (6) 
As discussed, intertemporal PIH implies ܽଶଵ =1, ܽଶଶ =0, and ܽଷ =0, while 
interstate full income sharing implies ܽଶଵ=0, ܽଶଶ=0, and ܽଷ=1. As a combination, partial 
risk commitment at the local community implies 0<ܽଶଵ<1 and 0<ܽଷ<1. By interacting each 
variable with mobile phone accessibility in a community, we also explore how the 
sensitivity of consumption with respect to each income shock differs according to mobile 
phone accessibility.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Impact of Mobile Phone on Consumption Smoothing 
Table 3 presents the estimation results. ∆ܿ௜௝,௧ (changes in real per adult equivalent 
consumption expenditure), ∆ݕ௜௝,௧  (changes in real per adult equivalent income), ∆ܿ௝̅,௧ 
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(changes in real per adult equivalent average consumption at LC1) are all expressed in the 
log form, such that the coefficients indicate elasticity.  
Column (1) is the benchmark model based on Eq. (1). It is clear that both 
household income and average consumption at LC1 affect household consumption 
positively and statistically significantly. A 1% increase in household income leads to about 
a 0.11% increase in household consumption, while a 1% increase in average LC1-level 
consumption is associated with a 0.54% increase in household consumption. The two 
further statistical tests show that the following null hypotheses are rejected at the 1% level: 
(1) ܪ଴: ܽଷ ൌ 1 (the coefficient on covariate shock is equal to unity); and (2) ܪ଴: ܽଷ ൌ
ܽଶ (the coefficient on covariate shock is equal to that on idiosyncratic income shocks). 
Consistent with a large body of literature (Townsend, 1994; Udry, 1994; Dercon and 
Krishnan; 2000), the results imply that the full income-sharing hypothesis is rejected and 
that household consumption tends to be more vulnerable to covariate shocks than to 
idiosyncratic shocks.  
Column (2) includes the changes in access to mobile phone networks and its 
interaction terms based on Eq. (2). Interestingly, the coefficient on changes in access to 
mobile phone networks is positive and significant, indicating that consumption grows more 
rapidly for households newly covered by mobile phone networks. Also, its interaction with 
idiosyncratic income shocks is negative but insignificant, while its interaction with 
covariate shocks is negative and significant. Indeed, the degree of consumption 
comovement with neighboring households decreases by 33% for households with 
improvements in mobile phone coverage relative to those without any improvement. This 
seems to suggest that households gaining access to mobile phones can better mitigate 
covariate shocks by mutual assistance over long distances.  
Column (3) includes LC1 fixed effects based on Eq. (3). This specification drops 
two variables—changes in access to mobile phone networks and its interaction with 
covariate shocks—because neither variable has variations within LC1. Again, the full 
income-sharing hypothesis is rejected, with the coefficient on idiosyncratic income shocks 
being positive and statistically significant. Also, its interaction with changes in mobile 
phone access is not statistically significant, indicating that the introduction of the mobile 
phone has no significant impact on idiosyncratic risk management.  
Finally, Column (4) uses a different dummy variable reflecting the access to 
mobile phones in 2005 instead of its change over time. The dummy variable takes the value 
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of 1 if LC1 is covered by mobile phone networks in 2005 and zero otherwise. The 
difference from the previous definition is that, in this new dummy variable, households 
covered by mobile phone networks in both 2003 and 2005 now take the value of 1 (zero 
previously). One may argue that this is more plausible for examining the impact of mobile 
phone coverage on long-distance risk sharing. Nonetheless, we see a result consistent with 
the previous estimation in that access to mobile phones is positively associated with 
household consumption, that its interaction with idiosyncratic income shocks is negative 
but insignificant, and that its interaction with covariate shocks is negative and highly 
significant.  
Overall, our findings suggest that covariate shocks tend to affect household 
consumption more, which cannot be effectively managed through the informal local risk 
sharing mechanism. In such a situation, households covered by mobile phone networks 
may rely on distant friends and relatives to maintain their consumption level.1 By contrast, 
once idiosyncratic income shocks occur, households do not rely as much on long-distance 
risk sharing mechanisms. Rather, it seems that idiosyncratic income shocks are not fully but 
only partially managed through traditional informal local risk-sharing mechanisms, which 
would presumably be less risky and less costly via face-to-face transactions.   
 
4.2. Impacts of Permanent and Transitory Income Shocks and Covariate Shocks 
 Having discussed the consumption sensitivity against idiosyncratic and covariate 
shocks, and differential impacts depending on mobile phone coverage, we turn to 
decompose idiosyncratic income shocks into permanent and transitory components. The 
changes in the log per adult equivalent income is regressed on the changes in household 
assets and demographic characteristics, which yield permanent component changes, as well 
as the number of sick household members and the dummy for crop damages in 2005, which 
yield transitory component changes. Specifically, household assets and demographic 
characteristics include a) the number of household members by age group, b) household 
head characteristics, such as age, gender, and education attainment, c) the number of 
cultivated plots and area owned, d) tropical units of livestock, and e) value of durable assets.  
The first-stage income determination function is presented in Appendix 1, and the residual 
is treated as “unexplained change.”  
                                                 
1 To understand the mechanism, we attempt to regress remittances income on mobile phone coverage 
using the pooled observations in 2003 and 2005. The results (not presented here) show that remittances 
significantly increase with mobile phone coverage, consistent with Munyegera and Matsumoto (2016).  
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Table 4 shows the results of the second-stage estimation based on Eq. (6). ∆ݕො௜௝,௧௉  
represents a predicted permanent income change, ∆ݕො௜௝,௧்  represents a predicted transitory 
income change, and ∆߱௜௝,௧ represents the residual.  
 Column (1) includes only each income component along with the covariate 
consumption level at LC1. Three important findings emerge. First, the coefficient on 
permanent incomes is positive and significant. The magnitude of this coefficient becomes 
larger than in the previous results, which assumes the capture of only a transient income 
shock. Second, the coefficient on transitory incomes is not statistically significant. Third, 
the coefficient on covariate shocks remains positive and significant. The null hypotheses 
that the coefficients on permanent income shocks and covariate shocks are unity are 
rejected at the 1% significance level. These findings partially support PIH, as transitory 
income does not affect consumption, yet full autarky insurance over the life cycle is also 
rejected because the coefficient on permanent income is not equal to unity. These results 
thus support the notion of limited commitment at the local community level, where 
idiosyncratic income shock is partially mitigated thorough local informal sharing, but they 
are far from perfect, presumably because not all idiosyncratic income changes are fully 
pooled and there is room to hide part of a household income from neighbors for 
self-insurance.  
 Column (2) includes each shock interacted with changes in mobile phone coverage. 
Consistent with the previous findings, access to mobile phones does not affect consumption 
sensitivity with respect to idiosyncratic income changes, regardless of whether they are 
permanent or transitory, as there are no statistical results on the interaction terms between 
mobile phone coverage and each idiosyncratic income component. The degree of 
consumption comovement with neighboring households again decreases by 33% for 
households with improvements in mobile phone coverage relative to those without any 
improvement, providing robust evidence that mobile phone coverage helps mitigate 
covariate shocks. Finally, we include LC1 fixed effects in Column (3). The qualitative 
inference is largely the same, in that the consumption is sensitive to permanent income 
changes but not transitory income changes, and mobile phone coverage does not help 
idiosyncratic income risk management.  
 
5. Extension of Analysis 
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One may argue that permanent, transitory, and unexplained income changes should 
be computed by the level, not in the log, because the sum of log income component 
changes does not match with the log total income change. To address this valid concern, we 
attempt to regress per adult equivalent income (USD) changes on the same explanatory 
variables (shown in Appendix 1) in the first stage, and the predicted values of permanent, 
transitory, and unexplained income changes are inserted in the second-stage estimation. 
The result in Table 5 indicates that this does not alter our main findings: (1) household 
consumption is positively associated with permanent income change but not transitory 
income change; (2) the interaction terms of each idiosyncratic income change with mobile 
phone coverage are largely insignificant (except for unexplained income change); and (3) 
the interaction term of covariate shocks with mobile phone coverage is negative and highly 
significant.  
Another possible extension is dealing with heterogeneity. So far, we have 
implicitly assumed that idiosyncratic and covariate shocks are linearly related to 
consumption changes and that the impacts are the same for poor and non-poor households. 
We relax this assumption and allow the coefficients to differ across distributions using a 
quantile regression method. We present the estimation results for the 10, 25, 50, 75, and 90 
percentiles in Table 6 and graphically show the differential coefficients in Figure 2. Again, 
the statistical inference is largely consistent with the previous estimation. Also, while Table 
6 reports somewhat nonlinear relationships between the explanatory variables and 
consumption changes, Figure 2 shows no particular patterns of the differential coefficient 
across distributions (such as U-shaped or inversed-U shaped). Rather, Figure 2 suggests 
that the coefficients differ little and are almost flat across the distributions.  
 
6. Conclusion  
The literature argues that a mutual informal insurance mechanism within a small 
local community has worked effectively to help smooth the consumption of households in 
the face of idiosyncratic, household-specific income shocks. However, covariate shocks 
whereby neighboring households suffer similar income shocks generally inactivate such 
informal arrangements. Using panel data collected in rural Uganda in 2003 and 2005, we 
examined whether covariate risk exposure could be mitigated by the introduction or 
expansion of mobile phone technology, which may make it easier and less costly for a 
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household to communicate with and request assistance from long-distance friends and 
relatives who do not suffer the same downside risks.  
The results indicated that both idiosyncratic and covariate shocks affect 
household-level consumption changes over time, at a magnitude greater for covariate 
shocks than for idiosyncratic shocks. Households in communities covered by mobile phone 
networks can, however, effectively reduce the degree of household consumption 
comovement with neighboring households by about 33%. This result implies that part of 
the covariate shocks is mitigated by long-distance risk sharing via mobile phone. On the 
other hand, there is no difference in the impact of idiosyncratic income shocks on 
household intertemporal consumption change across communities with different mobile 
phone coverage levels, even though partial risk sharing within local communities is 
identified. 
This paper also attempted to decompose household income shock into permanent 
and transitory components and examined the role of each income component on 
intertemporal household-level consumption changes. We found that consumption changes 
are insensitive to transitory income shocks but sensitive to permanent income shocks. This 
finding seems to demonstrate that the positive relationship between the first-differenced 
income and consumption, observed in the literature and in this study, is largely driven by 
permanent income component changes rather than transitory income changes, as is usually 
assumed in the literature. This finding partially supports PIH in that transitory income does 
not affect consumption, yet our results also demonstrate that full autarky insurance over the 
life cycle is rejected.  
Overall, these results imply that households combine self-autarky, local risk 
sharing, and long-distance risk sharing via mobile phone to manage risks, where 
idiosyncratic shocks are partially mitigated by self-insurance as well as mutual insurance 
within local communities, whereas covariate shocks are partially mitigated by 
self-insurance and across distant communities via mobile phones. This result clearly 
suggests that the extension of mobile phones effectively enhances households’ risk 
management strategies, especially for covariate shocks, by easily connecting them with 
households outside of their local communities, who do not suffer the same shocks.  
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Figure 1. Nonparametric (Lowess) Consumption Dynamics 
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Figure 2. Estimated Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals by Quantile Regression 
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Table 1. % Distribution of Mobile Phone Coverage by Region (N=871) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region Both 2003 and2005 Only  2005 No Access Total
Central 8.61 8.61 13.32 30.54
(28.2) (28.2) (43.61) (100)
East 3.21 13.66 27.21 44.09
(7.29) (30.99) (61.72) (100)
West 3.44 8.61 13.32 25.37
(13.57) (33.94) (52.49) (100)
Total 15.27 30.88 53.85 100
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Table 2. Changes in Household Welfare by Mobile Phone Coverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005 2003 2005
233.9 214.5 206.5 221.5 177.1 183.8 199.5 195.5
(226.8) (163.3) (159.4) (213.4) (151.1) (179.5) (186.3) (171.4)
214.8 187.5 227.0 193.2 145.4 161.4 170.8 185.7
(326.9) (230.8) (279.1) (264.6) (197.7) (195.9) (244.1) (231.5)
0.481 0.481 0.480 0.498 0.591 0.603 0.545 0.546
(0.502) (0.502) (0.501) (0.501) (0.492) (0.490) (0.498) (0.498)
8.105 7.820 7.454 7.621 7.576 7.462 7.619 7.566
(4.193) (4.264) (3.732) (3.812) (4.394) (3.690) (4.170) (3.818)
N
Adult equivalent per
capita consumption (US$)
Adult equivalent per
capita income (US$)
Poverty head count ratio
Household Size
Both 2003
and 2005 Only 2005 No Access Total
133 269 469 871
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Table 3. Consumption Sensitivity by Mobile Phone Coverage 
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Table 4. Consumption Sensitivity by Income Component and Mobile Phone 
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Table 5. Consumption Sensitivity with the Level of Income 
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Table 6. Consumption Sensitivity by Quantile Regression 
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Appendix 1. First-Stage Income Determination Function 
 
 
VARIABLES
Changes in log adult
equivalent income
Changes in Adult
equivalent income
(US$)
Changes in # Children (age<6) -0.0380 -10.18
(0.0430) (11.69)
Changes in # Young (6<age<15) -0.110*** -26.41***
(0.0305) (6.560)
Changes in # Adult (16<age<60) -0.116*** -22.10***
(0.0293) (6.562)
Changes in Elderly (61<age) -0.117* -9.020
(0.0592) (14.34)
Changes in Head Education 0.00976 0.746
(0.0193) (3.186)
Changes in Head Gender 0.138 20.94
(0.185) (21.68)
Changes in Head Age -0.00490 -0.178
(0.00317) (0.669)
Changes in # of Cultivate Plots 0.0774** 13.42
(0.0342) (8.875)
Changes in Landholdings (ha) 0.00130 -1.704**
(0.00141) (0.835)
Changes in TLU 0.0394*** 13.90***
(0.00797) (4.326)
Changes in value of durables 0.000105 0.0249
(7.19e-05) (0.0224)
# Sick members in 2005 0.0941 18.14
(0.0635) (12.61)
Crop Damage Dummy (=1) -0.0953 0.546
(0.0964) (19.20)
Constant 0.128 0.763
(0.0811) (18.66)
Observations 871 871
R-squared 0.109 0.165
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 2. Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean S.D.
Changes in Adult equivalent consumption (US$) -3.889 218.468
Changes in Adult equivalent income (US$) 14.672 288.123
Changes in Access to Mobile Phone Network 0.309 0.462
Changes in # Children (age<6) 0.015 1.195
Changes in # Young (6<age<15) 0.117 1.430
Changes in # Adult (16<age<60) 0.202 1.750
Changes in Elderly (61<age) 0.047 0.524
Changes in Head Education 0.037 2.316
Changes in Head Gender 0.007 0.179
Changes in Head Age 1.197 11.670
Changes in # of Cultivate Plots 0.721 1.103
Changes in Landholdings (ha) 1.206 24.267
Changes in Toropical Livestock Unit 0.413 5.536
Changes in the value of durables 80.423 768.473
# Sick members in 2005 0.350 0.585
Crop Damage Dummy (=1) 0.662 0.473
